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Abstract. RIPEMD-160 is a hash function published in 1996, which shares similarities
with other hash functions designed in this time-period like MD4, MD5 and SHA-1.
However, for RIPEMD-160, no (semi-free-start) collision attacks on the full number of
steps are known. Hence, it is still used, e.g., to generate Bitcoin addresses together with
SHA-256, and is an ISO/IEC standard. Due to its dual-stream structure, even semi-
free-start collision attacks starting from the first step only reach 36 steps, which were
firstly shown by Mendel et al. at Asiacrypt 2013 and later improved by Liu, Mendel
and Wang at Asiacrypt 2017. Both of the attacks are based on a similar freedom
degree utilization technique as proposed by Landelle and Peyrin at Eurocrypt 2013.
However, the best known semi-free-start collision attack on 36 steps of RIPEMD-160
presented at Asiacrypt 2017 still requires 255.1 time and 232 memory. Consequently,
a practical semi-free-start collision attack for the first 36 steps of RIPEMD-160
still requires a significant amount of resources. Considering the structure of these
previous semi-free-start collision attacks for 36 steps of RIPEMD-160, it seems hard
to extend it to more steps. Thus, we develop a different semi-free-start collision attack
framework for reduced RIPEMD-160 by carefully investigating the message expansion
of RIPEMD-160. Our new framework has several advantages. First of all, it allows
to extend the attacks to more steps. Second, the memory complexity of the attacks
is negligible. Hence, we were able to mount semi-free-start collision attacks on 36
and 37 steps of RIPEMD-160 with practical time complexity 241 and 249 respectively.
Additionally, we describe semi-free-start collision attacks on 38 and 40 (out of 80)
steps of RIPEMD-160 with time complexity 252 and 274.6, respectively. To the best
of our knowledge, these are the best semi-free-start collision attacks for RIPEMD-160
starting from the first step with respect to the number of steps, including the first
practical colliding message pairs for 36 and 37 steps of RIPEMD-160.
Keywords: hash function · RIPEMD-160 · freedom degree utilization · semi-free-start
collision attack
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1 Introduction
In the 1990s, most popular hash functions, like MD4, MD5, SHA-0, RIPEMD-160 [DBP96]
and SHA-1 followed a similar design strategy based on round functions involving modular
additions, word-wise rotations, and XORs (ARX). For 4 out of the aforementioned hash
functions, MD4 [Dob96, WLF+05], MD5 [WY05], SHA-0 [WYY05b] and SHA-1 [WYY05a,
SBK+17] practical collision attacks were shown and thus have been phased out in most
applications. However, if we look at RIPEMD-160, no collision attack on the full number
of rounds is known. Moreover, RIPEMD-160 is still used in several applications, e.g.,
to generate Bitcoin addresses together with SHA-256, and is still an ISO/IEC standard.
Hence, getting more insight into the security of RIPEMD-160 is of practical interest and
importance.
In contrast to MD4, MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1, the compression function of RIPEMD-
160 is of a more complex nature, since the chaining value is duplicated and processed
in two branches. Both branches, hereby employ a slightly different round function and
also the message expansion follows a different pattern. At the end of the compression
function, both branches are merged again to form the 160-bit internal state or final hash
value. This increased complexity seems to complicate the analysis, and in contrast to
MD4 [Dob96, WLF+05], MD5 [WY05], SHA-0 [WYY05b] and SHA-1 [WYY05a, SBK+17],
collision attacks on RIPEMD-160 do not reach the full number of rounds.
Sometimes, due to the difficulty to devise a collision attack on the hash function itself,
cryptanalysts may turn to analyzing its underlying compression function. Therefore, the
semi-free-start collision resistance and free-start collision resistance of the underlying
compression function will be investigated. A semi-free-start collision is generated with
two distinct messages and the same initial value, while a free-start collision is generated
with two distinct messages and two distinct initial values. In the rest of this paper, we
denote semi-free-start collision and free-start collision by SFS collision and FS collision
respectively. The generic time complexity of the SFS collision attack and FS collision
attack are both 2l/2 if the hash value is a l-bit value.
At Eurocrypt 2013, Landelle and Peyrin made a breakthrough [LP13] in the cryptanal-
ysis of RIPEMD-128, whose structure is the same as that of RIPEMD-160. Specifically,
they proposed a state-of-the-art technique to allow them to mount an SFS collision attack
on full RIPEMD-128. Such a technique was quickly applied to analyze the compression
function of RIPEMD-160 at Asiacrypt 2013. Consequently, significantly improved results
for reduced RIPEMD-160 were obtained then, which were an SFS collision attack on 42
steps of RIPEMD-160 starting from an intermediate step and an SFS collision attack
on 36 steps of RIPEMD-160 starting from the first step [MPS+13]. As follow-up works,
an SFS collision attack on 48 steps of RIPEMD-160 starting from an intermediate step
was achieved at ToSC 2017 [WSL17] and an improved SFS collision attack on 36 steps of
RIPEMD-160 starting from the first step was achieved at Asiacrypt 2017 [LMW17].
As for the collision (not SFS collision) attack on reduced RIPEMD-160, the first attempt
was made at Asiacrypt 2017 with rather high time complexity 270 [LMW17]. This attack
follows the idea of using a differential characteristic that is sparse on the left branch and
dense on the right branch, where message modification is used to fulfill as many conditions
as possible on the dense right branch. Recently, at Crypto 2019 [LDM+19], a different
strategy to find collisions was proposed, where the dense part is placed on the left branch
while the sparse part is placed on the right branch. As a result, they provided the first
colliding message pairs for 30 and 31 steps of RIPEMD-160 and a theoretical collision
attack for up to 34 steps. A summary of the cryptanalytic results1 for RIPEMD-160 is
given in Table 1.
1The sample code to verify the SFS collisions for 36 and 37 steps of RIPEMD-160 is available at
https://github.com/Crypt-CNS/SFSCollision_SampleCode.git
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It should be noted that the two SFS collision attacks for reduced RIPEMD-160 starting
from the first step share the same differential characteristic [MPS+13, LMW17]. Moreover,
the underlying idea of the two SFS collision attacks is almost the same. Specifically, the
dense parts with many differential conditions on both branches are firstly fixed. Then, the
remaining free message words are utilized to achieve efficient merging at the initial value,
which is following the idea from [LP13].
Up until now, there has not been a practical SFS collision example for the first 36
steps of RIPEMD-160. Moreover, the SFS collision attack on more steps of RIPEMD-
160 starting from the first step was out of reach as well. Thus, we are motivated to
further investigate the SFS collision resistance of reduced RIPEMD-160. To do so, we
place the dense differential characteristic on the left branch and the sparse differential
characteristic on the right branch in order to make the new SFS collision attack framework
work efficiently, which follows a similar spirit as in [LDM+19]. The contribution of this
paper is summarized below.
1.1 Our Contributions
With a new freedom degree utilization strategy, we develop an SFS collision attack
framework for reduced RIPEMD-160. Different from previous SFS collision attack frame-
works [MPS+13, LMW17] for RIPEMD-160 which require a costly degrees of freedom
consumption to achieve efficient merging at the initial value, no merging phase is needed
under the new attack framework. With such a new framework, we were able to extend
the SFS collision attacks on reduced RIEPMD-160 to more steps. In addition, there are
negligible memory requirements. Most importantly, combined with the use of automated
techniques [MNS11, MNS13, EMS14] to solve the nonlinear differential characteristic for
RIPEMD-160, improved SFS collision attacks for reduced RIPEMD-160 are obtained, as
specified below.
• The SFS collision attack on 36 and 37 steps of RIPEMD-160 are achieved with time
complexity 241 and 249 respectively. In addition, we also provide the corresponding
colliding message pairs.
• The SFS collision attack on 38 steps is achieved with time complexity 252.
• The SFS collision attack on 40 steps is achieved with time complexity 274.6.
1.2 Organization
This paper is organized as follows. The notation, and description of RIPEMD-160 is given
in Section 2. Then, we describe our SFS collision attack framework for reduced RIPEMD-
160 in Section 3. Next, we discuss how to get a desirable differential characteristic in
Section 4. Section 5 presents the application of our SFS collision attack framework to the
discovered differential characteristics. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we will introduce the notations used in this paper and the specification of
RIPEMD-160.
2.1 Notation
1. , ≪, ≫, ⊕, ∨, ∧ and ¬ represent the logic operations shift right, rotate left,
rotate right, exclusive or, or, and, negate, respectively.
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Table 1: Summary of preimage and collision attacks on reduced RIPEMD-160
Target Attack Type Steps Time Memory Ref.
comp. function preimage 31 2148 217 [OSS12]
hash function preimage 31 2155 217 [OSS12]
comp. function SFS collision
36/80a low negligible [MNSS12]
42/80a 275.5 264 [MPS+13]
48/80a 276.4 264 [WSL17]
36/80 270.4 264 [MPS+13]
36/80 255.1 232 [LMW17]
36/80 241 negligible Section 5.1
37/80 249 negligible Section 5.2
38/80 252 negligible Section 5.2
40/80 274.6 negligible Section 5.2
hash function collision
30/80 270 negligible [LMW17]
30/80 235.9 232 [LDM+19]
31/80 241.5 232 [LDM+19]
33/80 267.1 232 [LDM+19]
34/80 274.3 232 [LDM+19]
a An attack starting at an intermediate step.
2.  and  represent addition and subtraction modulo 232.
3. M = (m0, m1, ..., m15) and M ′ = (m′0, m′1, ..., m′15) represent two 512-bit message
blocks split into 32-bit words mi and m′i.
4. Klj and Krj represent the constant used for left (l) and right (r) branch at round j.
5. Φlj and Φrj represent the 32-bit Boolean function for the left (l) and right (r) branch
at round j.
6. sli and sri represent the rotation constant used at the left (l) and right (r) branch
during step i.
7. pi1(i) and pi2(i) represent the index of the message word used at the left (l) and right
(r) branch during step i.
8. Xi, Yi represent the 32-bit internal state of the left (l) and right (r) branch updated
during step i.
9. Xi,k and Yi,k represent the (k + 1)-th bit of Xi and Yi, where the least significant
bit is the 1st bit and the most significant bit is the 32nd bit. For example, Xi,0
represents the least significant bit of Xi.
10. MIN(a, b) represents the minimal value of a and b. MIN(a, b) = a if a ≤ b and
MIN(a, b) = b if a > b.
We also adopt the concept of generalized conditions of De Cannière and Rech-
berger [DR06] presented in Table 2.
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Table 2: Generalized conditions [DR06]
(x, x∗) (0,0) (1,0) (0,1) (1,1) (x, x∗) (0,0) (1,0) (0,1) (1,1)
? X X X X 3 X X − −
− X − − X 5 X − X −
x − X X − 7 X X X −
0 X − − − A − X − X
u − X − − B X X − X
n − − X − C − − X X
1 − − − X D X − X X
] − − − − E − X X X
• x represents one bit of the first message and x∗ represents the same bit of the
second message.
2.2 Description of RIPEMD-160
RIPEMD-160 is a 160-bit hash function based on the Merkle-Damgård construction. So
it is iterating a compression function H that takes as input a 512-bit message block Mi
and a 160-bit chaining variable CV i. We refer to [DBP96] for a detailed description
of the RIPEMD-160 hash function and focus on the compression function next. The
RIPEMD-160 compression function consists of two different parallel branches, which we
call left and right branch, indicated by the use of Xi and Yi, respectively. The compression
function is segregated into 5 rounds of 16 steps each in both branches, leading to a total
of 80 steps per branch.
2.2.1 Initialization
The compression function starts with an initialization, where the 160-bit chaining variable
CV i at the input is divided into five 32-bit words hj (j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4). Those five words hj
are used to initialize the state of the two branches:
X−4 = h≫100 , X−3 = h≫104 , X−2 = h≫103 , X−1 = h2, X0 = h1.
Y−4 = h≫100 , Y−3 = h≫104 , Y−2 = h≫103 , Y−1 = h2, Y0 = h1.
The initial value (CV 0) corresponds to:
X−4 = Y−4 = 0xc059d148, X−3 = Y−3 = 0x7c30f4b8, X−2 = Y−2 = 0x1d840c95,
X−1 = Y−1 = 0x98badcfe, X0 = Y0 = 0xefcdab89.
2.2.2 Message Expansion
Each 512-bit input message block is divided into 16 32-bit message words mi. The words
mi will be used for a single step in a permuted order pi1 and pi2 for left branch and right
branch, respectively.
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2.2.3 Step Function
At step i of round j, the internal state is updated in the following way.
LQi = X≪10i−5  Φlj(Xi−1, Xi−2, X≪10i−3 )mpi1(i) Klj ,
Xi = X≪10i−4  (LQi)≪s
l
i ,
RQi = Y≪10i−5  Φrj(Yi−1, Yi−2, Y≪10i−3 )mpi2(i) Krj ,
Yi = Y≪10i−4  (RQi)≪s
r
i ,
where i = (1, 2, 3, ..., 80) and j = (0, 1, 2, 3, 4). The details of the Boolean functions and
round constants for RIPEMD-160 are given in Table 3.
Table 3: Boolean Functions and Round Constants in RIPEMD-160
Round j φlj φrj Klj Krj Function Expression
0 XOR ONX 0x00000000 0x50a28be6 XOR(x, y, z) x⊕ y ⊕ z
1 IFX IFZ 0x5a827999 0x5c4dd124 IFX(x, y, z) (x ∧ y)⊕ (¬x ∧ z)
2 ONZ ONZ 0x6ed9eba1 0x6d703ef3 IFZ(x, y, z) (x ∧ z)⊕ (y ∧ ¬z)
3 IFZ IFX 0x8f1bbcdc 0x7a6d76e9 ONX(x, y, z) x⊕ (y ∨ ¬z)
4 ONX XOR 0xa953fd4e 0x00000000 ONZ(x, y, z) (x ∨ ¬y)⊕ z
2.2.4 Finalization
The finalization is performed after all 80 steps have been executed in both branches. The
five 32-bit words h′j (j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) composing the output chaining variable are computed
in the following way involving also the chaining value at the input of the compression
function hj (j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4):
h
′
0 = h1 X79  Y≪1078 ,
h
′
1 = h2 X≪1078  Y≪1077 ,
h
′
2 = h3 X≪1077  Y≪1076 ,
h
′
3 = h4 X≪1076  Y80,
h
′
4 = h0 X80  Y79.
3 SFS Collision Attack Framework
In this section, we will present the details of the new SFS collision attack framework.
For this framework, the message difference is inserted only at m12, which is first used to
update X13 and Y16. For such a way to choose the message difference, the corresponding
high-level presentation of the differential characteristic is depicted in Figure 1.
Since X13 is the first internal state with difference on the left branch and the boolean
function in the first round on this branch is exclusive or (XOR), we can first confirm
Observation 1 when constructing a differential characteristic.
Observation 1. There will be bit conditions on X12 ⊕X≪1011 , X13 ⊕X≪1012 and X14 ⊕
X≪1012 . In other words, if X13 and X14 are fixed, some bits of X12 have to take fixed values
in order to keep the conditions hold. To make the total number of the bit conditions on
X12 small, the total number of active bits in X13 and X14 should be as small as possible.
Moreover, considering the specifics of the message expansion of RIPEMD-160, one
more observation can be obtained, which will play an important role in our SFS attack
framework. Observation 2 is specified below.
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Figure 1: Attack on t steps of RIPEMD-160 by inserting difference at m12
Figure 2: Partial information of the message expansion of RIPEMD-160
Observation 2. For the left branch, X17 is updated with m7 in the second round. Besides,
m7 is used to update X42 in the third round.
For a better understanding of this paper, we also present partial information of the
message expansion, as illustrated in Figure 2. To make our SFS work efficiently, similar to
the collision attack presented at Crypto 2019 [LDM+19], we place the dense differential
characteristic on the left branch and the sparse differential characteristic on the right
branch.
3.1 Specification of the SFS collision attack framework
Based on the above strategy to construct a differential characteristic as well as the the
observation of the message expansion of RIPEMD-160, an efficient SFS collision attack
framework can be discovered, as illustrated in Figure 3. Suppose our aim is to mount an
SFS collision attack on t steps of RIPEMD-160. On the whole, the attack procedure can
be divided into 3 steps as follows.
Figure 3: SFS collision attack framework for RIPEMD-160
Step 1: Finding a starting point. Find a solution (starting point) for Xi (13 ≤ i ≤ t).
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With single-step message modification, randomly choose values forXi (13 ≤ i ≤ 32)
while keeping the conditions on them satisfied. Based on Observation 2, all message
words except m7 will be fixed. The remaining work is to ensure that the conditions
on Xi (33 ≤ i ≤ t) hold. Generally, the conditions on this part can be partially
satisfied with dedicated multi-step message modification. However, it will require
some manual work. As will be shown, finding a starting point is not the bottleneck
of our attack framework. Therefore, we remove the dedicated hand-tuned multi-
step message modification and use a non-optimized method to satisfy the conditions
on Xi (33 ≤ i ≤ t) for simplicity.
Step 2: Filtering invalid X12. Suppose there are n bit conditions on X12. Then, for a
fixed starting point, n bits of X12 will be fixed, thus leaving 232−n possible values
for X12 in total. For each possible value of X12, we can compute m7 as follows:
m7 = (X17 X≪1013 )≫7 XOR(X16, X15, X≪1014 )X≪1012 Kl0.
Consequently, for each possible value of X12, all message words will become fixed.
Then, we compute backward until X9 and check the bit conditions on X12⊕X≪1011
as well as the conditions on
LQi = (Xi X≪10i−4 )≫s
l
i (13 ≤ i ≤ 16),
which are used to ensure the correct propagation of the modular difference of Xi
(13 ≤ i ≤ 16). If these conditions hold, move to Step 3. Otherwise, choose another
possible value for X12 and repeat. If all 232−n possible values are used up, start
generating a new starting point and repeat Step 2.
Step 3: Verifying the right branch. Until this phase, all message words are fixed.
Then, for the left branch, we can compute backward to obtain the initial value.
At last, we compute forward to compute the internal states on the right branch.
If the conditions on the right branch do not hold, return to Step 2. Otherwise, an
SFS collision is found.
3.2 Generating a starting point
Note that when all possible values for X12 are used up, we have to generate another
starting point, i.e. another solution for Xi (13 ≤ i ≤ t). Actually, after one starting point
is obtained, a new starting point can be derived from it in negligible time, thus explaining
why Step 1 is not the bottleneck of our attack framework.
In the following, we will expand on how to derive a new starting point from an existing
one. For a better understanding of the next parts, we strongly suggest the readers can
refer to the message expansion of RIPEMD-160 in Figure 2 since the next parts strongly
rely on it.
There are two strategies to derive a new starting point for two different cases. Suppose
the conditions on X13 hold with probability 2−p3 and the conditions on Xi (36 ≤ i ≤ t)
hold with probability 2−p4 . The two strategies are as follows.
3.2.1 Strategy 1
This strategy is suitable for the case when p4 ≤ p3. The procedure to generate a new
starting point can be described below.
Strategy 1. Randomly choose a value for Xi (13 ≤ i ≤ 15) while keeping the conditions
on them satisfied. Then, modify m4, m13 and m1 as follows to keep X18, X19
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and X20 the same.
m4 = (X18 X≪1014 )≫s
l
18  IFX(X17, X16, X≪1015 )X≪1013 Kl1,
m13 = (X19 X≪1015 )≫s
l
19  IFX(X18, X17, X≪1016 )X≪1014 Kl1,
m1 = (X20 X≪1016 )≫s
l
20  IFX(X19, X18, X≪1017 )X≪1015 Kl1.
In this way, Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35) will stay the same. However, since X36 is
updated with m4, we have to recompute new values for Xi (36 ≤ i ≤ t) and
verify whether the conditions on them can still hold. If they do not hold,
start choosing another value for Xi (13 ≤ i ≤ 15) while keeping the conditions
on them satisfied and repeat the above procedure until the conditions on Xi
(36 ≤ i ≤ t) hold. Consequently, the time to generate a new starting point is
about 2p4 computations.
3.2.2 Strategy 2
This strategy is suitable for the case when p3 < p4. The procedure to generate a new
starting point can be described below.
Strategy 2. Randomly choose a value for Xi (14 ≤ i ≤ 15) while keeping the conditions
on them satisfied. Then, we compute X13 by using Xi (14 ≤ i ≤ 18) and m4
as follows.
X13 = ((X18 X≪1014 )≫s
l
18  IFX(X17, X16, X≪1015 )m4 Kl1)≫10.
Next, we verify the conditions on X13 and LQ17 = (X17X≪1013 )≫s
l
17 . If they
do not hold, start randomly choosing another valid value for Xi (14 ≤ i ≤ 15)
and repeat until the conditions on X13 and LQ17 = (X17 X≪1013 )≫s
l
17 hold.
If they hold, modify m13 and m1 as follows to keep X19 and X20 the same.
m13 = (X19 X≪1015 )≫s
l
19  IFX(X18, X17, X≪1016 )X≪1014 Kl1,
m1 = (X20 X≪1016 )≫s
l
20  IFX(X19, X18, X≪1017 )X≪1015 Kl1.
In this way, Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 39) will stay the same. Thus, for the attack on
fewer than 40 steps, the time to generate a new starting point is about 2p3
computations.
For the attack on 40 steps of RIPEMD-160, since X40 is updated with m1, we
have to recompute a new value for X40 and check its conditions. If they do not
hold, start choosing another new valid value for Xi (14 ≤ i ≤ 15) and repeat
until a valid starting point is found. For the attack on 40 steps of RIPEMD-160,
we only need to check whether LQ40 can satisfy its corresponding equation.
As will be shown in the 40-step differential characteristic, such a probability
is close to 1 and therefore the time to generate a starting point is also about
2p3 computations.
As shown in Strategy 2, we fix the value for m4 to keep the internal states Xi
(36 ≤ i ≤ t ≤ 39) the same. In this case, the degrees of freedom to generate a new starting
point are provided by the free bits of X14 and X15. When the right branch holds with a
relatively low probability, i.e. like the 40-step differential characteristic, a sufficient number
of starting points are needed. Therefore, we can also use the degrees of freedom of m4.
Specifically, we can first store all valid values for m4 which can make the conditions on Xi
(36 ≤ i ≤ t ≤ 39) hold in an array. This can be achieved by exhausting all valid values for
X36 and compute Xi (37 ≤ i ≤ t ≤ 39) as well as check the conditions on them for a fixed
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solution for Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35). Then, instead of only randomly choosing a valid value for
X14 and X15, we can also randomly choose a valid value for m4 from this array. In a word,
to generate a new starting point, the degrees of freedom can be provided by X14, X15 and
m4. Such a slightly modified Strategy 2 will require some memory to store all valid m4.
3.2.3 Generating the initial starting point
Indeed, the above two strategies to generate a new starting point imply that only one
solution Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35) is needed. For such a solution, m7, m4, m13 and m1 are not
fixed. If p4 ≤ p3, we directly use Strategy 1 to generate a starting point. If p3 < p4, we
first exhaust all valid values for X36 and compute the corresponding m4 (m4 is used to
update X36) as well as Xi (37 ≤ i ≤ t ≤ 39). Record the values for m4 which can make
the conditions on Xi (37 ≤ i ≤ t ≤ 39) hold. Then, Strategy 2 can be applied to find a
starting point.
Obviously, finding a solution for Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35) cannot be the bottleneck since
only three internal states X33, X34 and X35 cannot hold trivially. In our implementation,
when the number of conditions on X33, X34 and X35 is small, we simply make them hold
probabilistically, i.e. we repeat finding a solution for Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 32) with single-step
message modification until the conditions on Xi (33 ≤ i ≤ 35) hold. When the total
number of conditions are not too small, we will again use a simple start-from-the-middle
method to find a solution for Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35).
3.3 Complexity Evaluation
Although no differential characteristic is presented now, we can give a rough estimation of
the time complexity of the SFS collision attack on t (36 ≤ t ≤ 40) steps of RIPEMD-160
before considering a specific differential characteristic. This is owing to the efficiency of
our SFS collision attack framework.
Specifically, when a starting point is found, we can exhaust all valid values for X12 and
initially filter them by checking the conditions on X11 and LQi (13 ≤ i ≤ 16). When all
possible values for X12 are used up for a starting point, we can efficiently generate a new
starting point in time MIN(2p3 , 2p4), where p3 and p4 are defined in Section 3.2.
As shown in Figure 3, suppose the conditions on X12 ⊕X≪1011 and LQi (13 ≤ i ≤ 16)
hold with probability 2−p1 , and the fully probabilistic right branch holds with probability
2−p2 . Moreover, we also suppose there are n bit conditions on X12. Then, for each starting
point, we will verify the right branch with different m7 for about 232−n−p1 times. The
time complexity of this phase (exhausting all possible values of X12 and checking the right
branch) can be estimated as:
T0 =
4
80 · 2
32−n + 13 + t80 · 2
32−n−p1 .
As will be shown, p1 will be very small in our discovered differential characteristic, i.e.
p1 ≈ 2. Therefore, we roughly estimate the time complexity of this phase as
T0 =
4
80 · 2
32−n + 13 + t80 · 2
32−n−p1 ≈ 232−n−p1 .
However, the right branch holds with probability 2−p2 . Thus, it is expected to verify
the right branch for about 2p2 times under our SFS collision attack framework in order to
find an SFS collision. Since each starting point can only provide about 232−n−p1 attempts,
we need to have about 2p2−(32−n−p1) = 2p1+p2+n−32 starting points. Suppose only one
solution for Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35) is enough, which means m4, X14 and X15 can provide
sufficient degrees of freedom to generate 2p1+p2+n−32 starting points. Then, apart from
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Figure 4: Comparison between our framework and previous frameworks [LMW17,
MPS+13]
the initial starting point, each starting point can be generated with time MIN(2p3 , 2p4).
Thus, the total time complexity of our SFS collision attack on t steps of RIPEMD-160 is
T = MIN(2p3 , 2p4)× 2p1+p2+n−32 + 2p1+p2+n−32 × 232−n−p1
= MIN(2p3 , 2p4)× 2p1+p2+n−32 + 2p2 .
As will be shown in the differential characteristics, p1 ≈ 2, MIN(2p3 , 2p4) ≤ 25 and
n ≤ 3. Thus, we have
T = MIN(2p3 , 2p4)× 2p1+p2+n−32 + 2p2 ≤ 25+2+p2+3−32 + 2p2 ≈ 2p2 . (1)
In other words, under our SFS collision attack framework, the time complexity to find
an SFS collision for t steps of RIPEMD-160 is fully dominated by the probabilistic right
branch.
3.4 Advantage
As can be observed, our new SFS collision attack framework is different from previous
ones presented at Asiacrypt 2013 [MPS+13] and Asiacrypt 2017 [LMW17], as depicted in
Figure 4. Compared with the SFS collision attack frameworks for 36 steps of RIPEMD-
160 [LMW17, MPS+13], our new SFS collision attack framework can bring the following
three advantages.
• The memory complexity is negligible for our new framework, while it is 232 in previous
work [LMW17, MPS+13] after an optimization based on [LMW17]. It should be
noted that 232 memory is practical in a way. However, it will be still somewhat
expensive for a parallel search.
• Our new framework allows us to mount SFS collision attack on more steps of RIPEMD-
160 when inserting a message difference at the message word m12. However, it seems
difficult to attack more steps when adopting the framework [LMW17, MPS+13] by
inserting difference at m7. As will be shown, the new framework can be used to
mount SFS collision attack on 36/37/38/40 steps of RIPEMD-160.
• The framework can provide significantly improved results for the SFS collision attack
on reduced RIPEMD-160.
3.4.1 Remark
With the start-from-the-middle structure, while it is hard to turn an SFS collision attack
into a collision attack due to the match with the predefined initial value, it is easy to turn
a collision attack into an SFS collision attack.
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For the dense-left-and-sparse-right (DLSR) collision attack framework in [LDM+19],
an intuitive idea to convert it into an SFS collision attack framework is to remove the
connecting phase. Specifically, the starting point is a solution for Xi (11 ≤ i ≤ 23) in the
DLSR framework [LDM+19]. Then, the attacker can always first keep the conditions on
Xi (24 ≤ i ≤ 32) satisfied with single-step message modification since their corresponding
message words are used for the first time. Finally, for each valid value for Xi (24 ≤ i ≤ 32),
all message words become fixed and therefore the attacker can compute the remaining
internal states on both branches and verify their conditions.
For the 34-step differential characteristic in [LDM+19], the probability that the condi-
tions on the remaining internal states hold is not too low, i.e. greater than 2−40, one can
repeat choosing valid values for Xi (24 ≤ i ≤ 32) with single-step message modification
and verify these conditions. Once they are satisfied, an SFS collision is found. Obviously,
the time complexity to find an SFS collision for 34 steps of RIPEMD-160 will not exceed
240 and is practical. However, if it is directly applied to a longer differential characteristic,
one has to deal with the conditions in the third round on the left branch.
Compared with the above naive SFS collision attack framework derived from the DLSR
collision attack framework in [LDM+19], our new framework adopts a better freedom
degree utilization strategy, thus performing better for a longer differential characteristic.
In our new framework, the starting point is a solution for Xi (13 ≤ i ≤ t) while it is a
solution for Xi (11 ≤ i ≤ 23) in [LDM+19]. Especially, we also show that the total time
complexity is fully dominated by the right branch under our new SFS collision attack
framework if a suitable differential characteristic is obtained. Determining such an almost
optimal freedom degree utilization strategy is obviously non-trivial.
4 Differential Characteristics
Our SFS collision attack procedure to find a semi-free-collision for reduced RIPEMD-
160 has been explained in detail in Section 3. Thus, the next task is to find a suitable
differential characteristic to make the framework work efficiently. Thanks to the use of
automated techniques [MNS11, MNS13, EMS14], this task can be finished efficiently. Thus,
the remaining work is to add some constraints on the differential characteristic before the
search in order to find a desirable one.
As explained in Section 3, once a solution for the starting point is found, we can
immediately utilize the degrees of freedom provided by X12. Besides, there will be a
filtering phase to filter invalid X12. We expect there are sufficient valid X12 left after
filtering. Thus, the desirable differential characteristic have the following properties.
• There should be only one active bit in X12 so that there is only one bit condition on
X11.
• The probability that LQi = (XiX≪10i−4 )≫s
l
i (13 ≤ i ≤ 16) satisfy their correspond-
ing equations should be as high as possible.
• The total number of active bits in X13 and X14 should be as small as possible so
that there are a few bit conditions on X12. This is to ensure X12 can take as many
possible values as possible before filtering.
When taking the generation of new starting points into account, we can expect that
the cost is as small as possible. Besides, there should be sufficient degrees of freedom
provided by X14 and X15 and m4. Thus, the desirable differential characteristic should
have the following extra properties.
• The total number of active bits in X15, X16, X17 should be as small as possible.
Besides, the probability that LQi = (Xi  X≪10i−4 )≫s
l
i(17 ≤ i ≤ 19) satisfy their
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corresponding equations should be as high as possible. In this way, it is expected
that X14 and X15 can provide sufficient degrees of freedom.
• The probability that the conditions on Xi (36 ≤ i ≤ t ≤ 39) hold should not be too
small. Then, we can also utilize the degrees of freedom provided by m4.
In a word, the differential characteristic located at Xi (13 ≤ i ≤ 17) and Xi (36 ≤ i ≤ t)
should be as sparse as possible. Then, we can solve the nonlinear differential characteristic
located atXi (18 ≤ i ≤ 35) with the use of automated techniques [MNS11, MNS13, EMS14].
The desirable discovered differential characteristics are displayed in Table 12, Table 13,
Table 14 and Table 15 in Appendix A respectively. In addition, we also provide the solution
for Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35) in Table 4.
As will be shown, the colliding message pairs for 36 and 37 steps of RIPEMD-160 have
been found. For 38 steps of RIPEMD-160, the time complexity is 252, which may become
practical with more powerful computing resources. However, such powerful computing
resources are out of our reach. For the attack on 39 steps under our framework, the right
branch will hold with probability about 2−59, suggesting that the time complexity will
be about 259 if a suitable differential characteristic can be found. Thus, for the attack
with relatively high time complexity, we focus on more steps. In other words, we will
concentrate on the theoretical SFS collision attack on 40 steps of RIPEMD-160.
5 Application
In this section, we present the results of the new SFS collision attack on 36/37/38/40 steps
of RIPEMD-160. As our attack framework requires, we have to focus on the conditions on
the following part:
1. The conditions on the right branch, which will influence the whole time complexity.
2. The conditions on X12, which will influence the total number of possible values for X12
before filtering.
3. The conditions on X11 and LQi (13 ≤ i ≤ 16), which will influence the filtering phase.
4. The conditions on X13 and LQ17, which will influence the time to generate a new
starting point.
5. The conditions on Xi (14 ≤ i ≤ 15), which will influence the degrees of freedom to
generate a new starting point. We stress here that we have added extra conditions on
X14 and X15 to make LQi (18 ≤ i ≤ 19) satisfy their equations. Therefore, even if X14
and X15 are changed, LQi (18 ≤ i ≤ 19) will always satisfy their equations.
6. The conditions on Xi (36 ≤ i ≤ t), which will influence the total number of valid m4.
In other words, it will also influence the degrees of freedom to generate a starting point.
Therefore, when describing the SFS collision attack in next sections, we will firstly list
the above conditions.
5.1 Practical SFS Collision on 36 Steps of RIPEMD-160
As discussed above, we first list in Table 6 some conditions influencing the performance
of the SFS collision attack, which are not presented in Table 12. As Table 6 shows, the
probability that LQ36 satisfies its corresponding equations is close to 1 (there is no need
to consider the bit conditions on X36 when we attack 36 steps of RIPEMD-160), while the
conditions on X13 hold with probability 2−5. Therefore, we use Strategy 1 to generate a
new starting point, whose cost can be neglected.
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Table 4: Solution for Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35)
36 steps 37 steps
m0 = 0x6c2c8526,m2 = 0x16188d15, m0 = 0x2a3e3e5d,m2 = 0xc5ab4a9c,
m3 = 0xc6c5da57, m5 = 0xf7a7a97a, m3 = 0xdc1f16ce, m5 = 0x848cc0fe,
m6 = 0xa7cbbf38, m8 = 0xb6477677, m6 = 0xf11aa5a3, m8 = 0x9e6914b7,
m9 = 0x47f24a3e, m10 = 0xb1bdf3b5, m9 = 0xfe96a9cf, m10 = 0xda48b5c6,
m11 = 0x78aaa252, m12 = 0x69a579f0, m11 = 0x59b4296f, m12 = 0x14a47a10,
m14 = 0xbb877480, m15 = 0x5caa647e. m14 = 0x3b3e4837, m15 = 0x7f4d5b3f.
X16 101001111011110011u10011110n1100 X16 101010000010001101n1000101uu0110
X17 n0010101101100111100110111101111 X17 u1000100111000111001111001000100
X18 010001011110111001111101nu001001 X18 00000000010011111u0001001u111000
X19 1100110111011111u010100n00100001 X19 n1111110100011000110111u10000001
X20 11010000110001101n10001011010000 X20 0010n100n0110111u1uu110010100110
X21 nnnn1nn10101111101011nu110100u10 X21 001110u000101101000100u100011011
X22 1001001nu1101u0n1001n1nuununnu11 X22 1101100u10u000un0100001uuuuu1000
X23 nn110u11n10nu100n001nnn10u11nnu1 X23 1un11nuu11100u0u11u1uuun1001010u
X24 1101nu0010uun01nu1n0000nn1101u10 X24 110n11nn1001uu110u0n10u1u0nu001u
X25 11uu1nn10n011001n0u01uuu1n101uuu X25 00n0010n0nn0un0000nnn01u11u10100
X26 1101011u1un0u100u01uuuuuu0010010 X26 0nnnnn001101011110nnnnnn011u0u10
X27 0u11u0010011n111uuun001111000111 X27 01000011nn0110u1100n01uu00n101u1
X28 11000100n11nnn0n11100n010n0n0nn1 X28 1nu11111uu1un0u01n0n1nnnn1100n00
X29 01n00nu000u01nnu101uuu0ununun11n X29 u001uuuu00u0101un010011u0001n0uu
X30 n1u01n10u010011n000110100000un1u X30 1110000101110u10u100uuu0010uuu01
X31 01n1000nnn01101010110111nnn0110u X31 11011110010101nnn0110nnn10110111
X32 10n0101000000011111001001000010u X32 0000110110111u01n001011101111101
X33 01n0001101101000100100001000110u X33 10110110000011110111111011011001
X34 01010101010010111110101000111111 X34 01011101011010100010101100001110
X35 10110000101111011111110111101101 X35 00001111000001010111110011000100
38 steps 40 steps
m0 = 0xc32cb8b2,m2 = 0xdcebf941, m0 = 0x31973617,m2 = 0x3f5a3668,
m3 = 0x473889d3, m5 = 0x38875789, m3 = 0xfc3ffea2, m5 = 0x97ccd10f,
m6 = 0xcc53e680, m8 = 0xb8dce09a, m6 = 0x41688e61, m8 = 0x69a1d2a2,
m9 = 0xcb87a927, m10 = 0x67c766e5, m9 = 0x5b2331f3, m10 = 0x1c7c9435,
m11 = 0x9c0866a4, m12 = 0x6dcd4ef1, m11 = 0x9d41f6eb, m12 = 0x1f5f0b1b,
m14 = 0x74e28f11, m15 = 0x898b12aa. m14 = 0x19ec64c9, m15 = 0x86c9080.
X16 000100010101111111u1000101uu1100 X16 001110010011001110u111101n0u1001
X17 u1111101010000011100001110001110 X17 u1110110001101101100001110100001
X18 0101011111001000111100001u101000 X18 0000001010101101011111000u011010
X19 010101100110100nu111101n10101010 X19 1000011100010110u001111u10000001
X20 00000001u1101101uu11110011010011 X20 11110011u111011n0u10010001001011
X21 1101110101100000110001u100011000 X21 0101111100000100001001u001000000
X22 1100n0unu10un1nn01unnnnnnnnnnn10 X22 101001010101100u1100010110011110
X23 n0uuu1100010nuuu0uuuu1nun101nu11 X23 100010u011001u100011100001010111
X24 1011111101un01u10011000001101000 X24 10011n0u01011011110unnnn1001un11
X25 uu1110n001000100010nuu01u11101n0 X25 111100010n0u0nnn010011un10011100
X26 01nu101u11u00010100u000011u10111 X26 unu001uu001u01001u101101111u11u1
X27 01000uu0010u1n0100nnn11011n11101 X27 011un011nnuuuuuuuu10000u00u100u0
X28 0u10u000110000011100001000000101 X28 00111nun0111u1nn0nnnnnn10n00nnn1
X29 10101010111n001000001n0n1001n100 X29 nn111010n0101010100010u1un10101n
X30 n100010u01101100u010100110n10101 X30 0111u11010000n01101100uuu11101u0
X31 00uuuuuu0110nu111100010101111110 X31 n001u110n10u1110nn11u0100111110n
X32 u11111n100110110n01u0101nuu10000 X32 1000uun010n1n011u011110100n0nu01
X33 00011111110un0100010101100001100 X33 0u1110101100u01u1111n01u000111n0
X34 u11n1001101110101101000100000111 X34 011n11n0010u10n01000000100001011
X35 10010010010011110110101110101110 X35 0u0000001001101101111111110001n1
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Moreover, based on Table 6 and Table 12, there will be 232−3 = 229 possible values for
X12 for a given starting point. After filtering, about 229−1.7 = 227.3 valid values for X12
are left. Since the right branch holds with probability 2−41, we need to generate about
241−27.3 = 213.7 starting points. It should be noticed in Table 6 that there is a sufficient
number of free bits in Xi (13 ≤ i ≤ 15). Therefore, we can only use one solution for Xi
(16 ≤ i ≤ 35). Thus, the time complexity to mount an SFS collision attack on 36 steps of
RIPEMD-160 can be evaluated with the Eqn. 1 in Section 3.3, where
(p1, p2, p3, p4, n) = (1.7, 41, 5, 0, 3).
Therefore, the time complexity to find an SFS collision for 36 steps is 241.
We have implemented the attack. Specifically, we ran 25 different SFS collision search
instances on 25 CPUs with different seeds simultaneously. Moreover, the solution for Xi
(16 ≤ i ≤ 35) for the 25 search instances is also different from each other. We obtained
4 colliding message pairs in about one day. The colliding message pair in Table 5 was
obtained in less than 20 minutes.
Table 5: SFS collision for 36 steps of RIPEMD-160
h0 ∼ h4 809825f7 d2a55861 6bd86be7 fc58a6cb 11f6a005
M
6c2c8526 dc3084cc 16188d15 c6c5da57 73f15b99 f7a7a97a a7cbbf38 53a4b30
b6477677 47f24a3e b1bdf3b5 78aaa252 69a579f0 72b32f35 bb877480 5caa647e
M ′ 6c2c8526 dc3084cc 16188d15 c6c5da57 73f15b99 f7a7a97a a7cbbf38 53a4b30b6477677 47f24a3e b1bdf3b5 78aaa252 69a5f9f0 72b32f35 bb877480 5caa647e
hash value 88f79fa4 c9973719 dcf0ff7f 15cef816 a9d702a5
Table 6: Other conditions influencing the attack for the 36-step differential characteristic
Conditions Probability
Y18 Y18,31 = Y17,31 2−1
Y22 Y22,9 = Y21,9 2−1
Y26 Y26,20 = Y25,20, Y26,19 = Y25,19 2−2
Y30 Y30,0 = Y29,0, Y30,29 = Y29,29, Y30,30 = Y29,30 2−3
Y34 Y34,7 ∨ ¬Y33,7 = 1, Y34,10 ∨ ¬Y33,10 = 1 2−1
RQ16 (RQ16  0x8000)≪6 = RQ≪616  0x200000 Negligible
RQ28 (RQ28  0x8000)≪7 = RQ≪728  0x400000 Negligible
RQ35 (RQ35  0xfffffc80)≪15 = RQ≪1535  0xfe400000 Negligible
Right Branch 2−33−8 = 2−41
X12 X12,19 6= X13,29, X12,18 6= X13,28, X12,11 = X14,21 2−3
X11 X11,11 = X12,21 2−1
LQ13 (LQ13  0x8000)≪6 = LQ≪613  0x200000 Negligible
LQ14 (LQ14  0x200000)≪7 = LQ≪714  0x10000000 2−0.1
LQ15 (LQ15  0xf0200000)≪9 = LQ≪915  0x3fffffe0 2−0.6
LQ16 (LQ16  0xfffffe0)≪8 = LQ≪816  0xffffe010 Negligible
Filtering 2−1.7
X13 X13,27 = X14,5, X13,20 6= X14,30, X13,19 6= X15,29, X13,18 = X15,28 2−4
X15 X15,13 = X14,3, X15,4 = X14,26, X15,21 6= X16,31 2−3
The number of free bits in X14 and X15: 64− 3− 4 = 57
LQ36 (LQ36  0x38007)≪7 = LQ≪736  0x1c00380 Negligible
The expected number of valid m4: 232−0 = 232
The expected number of starting points for a fixed Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35): 257+32−5 = 284
5.2 SFS Collision for 37/38/40 Steps of RIPEMD-160
Similarly, for the SFS collision attack on 37/38/40 steps of RIPEMD-160 under our attack
framework, we first list some conditions influencing the performance of the SFS collision
attack in Table 7, Table 9, Table 10, which are not presented in Table 13, Table 14,
Table 15.
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5.2.1 Attack on 37 steps of RIPEMD-160
Based on Table 7 and Table 13, we conclude that there will be 232−2 = 230 possible values
for X12 for a given starting point. After filtering, about 230−2 = 228 are left. Since the
conditions on Xi (36 ≤ i ≤ 37) hold with probability 2−2.3 and the conditions on X13 hold
with probability 2−4, we use Strategy 1 to generate a new starting point, whose cost is
about 22.3 computations. Since the right branch holds with probability 2−49, we expect
that it will be required to generate 249−28 = 221 starting points. As Table 7 shows, Xi
(13 ≤ i ≤ 15) can provide sufficient degrees of freedom to generate so many starting points
for a fixed solution for Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35). Thus, the time complexity to mount an SFS
collision attack on 37 steps of RIPEMD-160 can be evaluated with the Eqn. 1, where
(p1, p2, p3, p4, n) = (2, 49, 4, 2.3, 2).
Therefore, the time complexity to find an SFS collision for 37 steps of RIPEMD-160 is 249.
We tried our best and have found a colliding message pair for 37 steps of RIPEMD-160, as
shown in Table 8. Specifically, we started a search on 31 CPUs simultaneously and this
colliding message pair was obtained on one of the 31 CPUs with the right branch checked
for about 244 times.
Table 7: Other conditions influencing the attack for the 37-step differential characteristic
Conditions Probability
Y18 Y18,31 = Y17,31 2−1
Y22 Y22,9 = Y21,9 2−1
Y26 Y26,20 = Y25,20, Y26,19 = Y25,19 2−2
Y30 Y30,0 = Y29,0, Y30,29 = Y29,29, Y30,30 = Y29,30 2−3
Y34 Y34,7 ∨ ¬Y33,7 = 1, Y34,10 ∨ ¬Y33,10 = 1 2−1
RQ16 (RQ16  0x8000)≪6 = RQ≪616  0x200000 Negligible
RQ28 (RQ28  0x8000)≪7 = RQ≪728  0x400000 Negligible
RQ35 (RQ35  0xfffffc80)≪15 = RQ≪1535  0xfe400000 Negligible
Right Branch 2−41−8 = 2−49
X12 X12,18 6= X13,28, X12,11 6= X14,21 2−2
X11 X11,11 6= X12,21 2−1
LQ13 (LQ13  0x8000)≪6 = LQ≪613  0x200000 Negligible
LQ14 (LQ14  0xffe00000)≪7 = LQ≪714  0xf0000000 2−0.1
LQ15 (LQ15  0xfe00000)≪9 = LQ≪915  0xc0000020 2−0.6
LQ16 (LQ16  0xd0000020)≪8 = LQ≪816  0x1fd0 2−0.3
Filtering 2−2
X13 X13,20 6= X14,30, X13,18 6= X15,28 2−2
X15 X15,13 = X14,3, X15,4 = X14,26 2−2
The number of free bits in X14 and X15: 64− 2− 7 = 55
LQ36 (LQ36  0xe1c0000)≪7 = LQ≪736  0xe000007 2−0.2
LQ37 (LQ37  0xf2000000)≪14 = LQ≪1437  0xfffffc80 2−0.1
The expected number of valid m4: 232−0.2−0.1−2 = 229.7
The expected number of starting points for a fixed Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35): 255+29.7−4 = 280.7
Table 8: SFS collision for 37 steps of RIPEMD-160
h0 ∼ h4 51c683bc e9cd8258 75924d6d b31d5b2b 9f1418b8
M
2a3e3e5d 2f3acda8 c5ab4a9c dc1f16ce 695a6d71 848cc0fe f11aa5a3 65da8473
9e6914b7 fe96a9cf da48b5c6 59b4296f 14a47a10 c0870c31 3b3e4837 7f4d5b3f
M ′ 2a3e3e5d 2f3acda8 c5ab4a9c dc1f16ce 695a6d71 848cc0fe f11aa5a3 65da84739e6914b7 fe96a9cf da48b5c6 59b4296f 14a4fa10 c0870c31 3b3e4837 7f4d5b3f
hash value 4ba88e59 fe3d1b6d 92324a6e 124af3ea e0206481
5.2.2 Attack on 38 steps of RIPEMD-160
Based on Table 9 and Table 14, we conclude that there will be 232−2 = 230 possible values
for X12 for a given starting point. After filtering, about 230−2 = 228 are left. Since the
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conditions on Xi (36 ≤ i ≤ 38) hold with probability 2−13.3 and the conditions on X13
hold with probability 2−4, we use Strategy 2 to generate a new starting point, whose cost
is about 24 computations. Since the right branch holds with probability 2−52, we expect
that it will be required to generate 252−28 = 224 starting points. As Table 7 shows, Xi
(14 ≤ i ≤ 15) can provide sufficient degrees of freedom to generate so many starting points
for a fixed solution for Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35). Specifically, for a valid m4, there are 57 free bits
in X14 and X15, while the conditions on X13 hold with probability 2−4. Therefore, for a
fixed solution for Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35) and a valid m4, we can expect to generate 257−4 = 253
starting points in total. Thus, the time complexity to mount an SFS collision attack on 38
steps of RIPEMD-160 can be evaluated with the Eqn. 1, where
(p1, p2, p3, p4, n) = (2, 52, 4, 13.3, 2).
Therefore, the time complexity to find an SFS collision for 38 steps of RIPEMD-160 is 252.
Table 9: Other conditions influencing the attack for the 38-step differential characteristic
Conditions Probability
Y18 Y18,31 = Y17,31 2−1
Y22 Y22,9 = Y21,9 2−1
Y26 Y26,20 = Y25,20, Y26,19 = Y25,19 2−2
Y30 Y30,0 = Y29,0, Y30,29 = Y29,29, Y30,30 = Y29,30 2−3
Y34 Y34,7 ∨ ¬Y33,7 = 1, Y34,10 ∨ ¬Y33,10 = 1 2−1
Y37 Y37,3 ∨ ¬Y36,3 = 1, Y37,0 ∨ ¬Y36,0 = 1 2−1
RQ16 (RQ16  0x8000)≪6 = RQ≪616  0x200000 Negligible
RQ28 (RQ28  0x8000)≪7 = RQ≪728  0x400000 Negligible
RQ35 (RQ35  0xfffffc80)≪15 = RQ≪1535  0xfe400000 Negligible
RQ38 (RQ38  0x7)≪6 = RQ≪638  0x1c0 Negligible
Right Branch 2−43−9 = 2−52
X12 X12,18 6= X13,28, X12,11 = X14,21 2−2
X11 X11,11 6= X12,21 2−1
LQ13 (LQ13  0x8000)≪6 = LQ≪613  0x200000 Negligible
LQ14 (LQ14  0xffe00000)≪7 = LQ≪714  0xf0000000 2−0.1
LQ15 (LQ15  0xfe00000)≪9 = LQ≪915  0xc0000020 2−0.6
LQ16 (LQ16  0xd0000020)≪8 = LQ≪816  0x1fd0 2−0.3
Filtering 2−2
X13 X13,20 = X14,30, X13,18 6= X15,28, X13,27 6= X14,5 2−3
X15 X15,13 = X14,3, X15,4 = X14,26, X15,21 6= X16,31 2−3
The number of free bits in X14 and X15: 64− 3− 4 = 57
LQ36 (LQ36  0xefffff04)≪7 = LQ≪736  0xffff81f8 2−0.1
LQ37 (LQ37  0x7fc8)≪14 = LQ≪1437  0x1ff20000 2−0.2
LQ38 (LQ38  0xe0000000)≪9 = LQ≪938  0x1c0 2−3
The expected number of valid m4: 232−0.1−0.2−3−10 = 218.7
The expected number of starting points for a fixed Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35): 257+18.7−4 = 271.7
5.2.3 Attack on 40 steps of RIPEMD-160
Based on Table 10 and Table 15, we conclude that there will be 232−2 = 230 possible
values for X12 for a given starting point. After filtering, about 230−2 = 228 are left. Since
the conditions on Xi (36 ≤ i ≤ 39) hold with probability 2−21.8, the conditions on X13
hold with probability 2−4, and LQ40 satisfies its equation with a probability close to 1, we
use Strategy 2 to generate a new starting point, whose cost is about 24 computations.
Since the right branch holds with probability 2−74.6, we expect that it will be required to
generate 274.6−28 = 247.6 starting points. As Table 7 shows, Xi (14 ≤ i ≤ 15) can provide
sufficient degrees of freedom to generate so many starting points for a fixed solution for
Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35). Specifically, for a valid m4, there are 57 free bits in X14 and X15, while
the conditions on X13 hold with probability 2−4. Therefore, for a fixed solution for Xi
(16 ≤ i ≤ 35) and a valid m4, we can expect to generate 257−4 = 253 starting points in
total. Indeed, we can also store some solutions for m4 in an array with negligible memory.
Then, as stated previously, we not only can choose valid values for X14 and X15, but
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also can randomly choose valid values for m4 from this array. In this way, the degrees
of freedom of m4 can be utilized as well. Thus, the time complexity to mount an SFS
collision attack on 40 steps of RIPEMD-160 can be evaluated with the Eqn. 1, where
(p1, p2, p3, p4, n) = (2, 74.6, 4, 21.8, 2).
Therefore, the time complexity to find an SFS collision for 40 steps of RIPEMD-160 is
274.6.
Table 10: Other conditions influencing the attack for the 40-step differential characteristic
Conditions Probability
Y18 Y18,31 = Y17,31 2−1
Y22 Y22,9 = Y21,9 2−1
Y26 Y26,20 = Y25,20, Y26,19 = Y25,19 2−2
Y30 Y30,0 = Y29,0, Y30,29 = Y29,29, Y30,30 = Y29,30 2−3
Y37 Y37,3 ∨ ¬Y36,3 = 1 2−0.5
Y38 Y38,17 ∨ ¬Y37,17 = 1,Y38,20 ∨ ¬Y37,20 = 1 2−1
RQ16 (RQ16  0x8000)≪6 = RQ≪616  0x200000 Negligible
RQ28 (RQ28  0x8000)≪7 = RQ≪728  0x400000 Negligible
RQ35 (RQ35  0x380)≪15 = RQ≪1535  0x1c00000 Negligible
RQ38 (RQ38  0xfffffff7)≪6 = RQ≪638  0xfffffdc0 Negligible
RQ39 (RQ39  0xfff20000)≪6 = RQ≪639  0xfc800000 2−0.1
RQ40 (RQ40  0xffffffc8)≪14 = RQ≪1440  0xfff20000 Negligible
Right Branch 2−66−8.6 = 2−74.6
X12 X12,18 = X13,28, X12,11 6= X14,21 2−2
X11 X11,11 6= X12,21 2−1
LQ13 (LQ13  0x8000)≪6 = LQ≪613  0x200000 Negligible
LQ14 (LQ14  0xffe00000)≪7 = LQ≪714  0xf0000000 2−0.1
LQ15 (LQ15  0xefe00000)≪9 = LQ≪915  0xbfffffe0 2−0.6
LQ16 (LQ16  0x2fffffe0)≪8 = LQ≪816  0xffffe030 2−0.3
Filtering 2−2
X13 X13,20 = X14,30, X13,18 = X15,28, X13,27 = X14,5 2−3
X15 X15,13 = X14,3, X15,4 = X14,26, X15,21 6= X16,31 2−3
The number of free bits in X14 and X15: 64− 3− 4 = 57
X36 X36,6 ∨ ¬X35,6 = 1 2−0.5
LQ36 (LQ36  0x50c3fee0)≪7 = LQ≪736  0x61ff7028 2−1.3
LQ37 (LQ37  0xd6008f90)≪14 = LQ≪1437  0x23e3f580 2−0.5
LQ38 (LQ38  0xdc1c0000)≪9 = LQ≪938  0x37ffffb8 2−0.6
LQ39 (LQ39  0xc8000048)≪13 = LQ≪1339  0x8f900 2−0.4
LQ38 (LQ40  0xfff20700)≪15 = LQ≪1540  0x37ffff9 Negligible
The expected number of valid m4: 232−1.3−0.5−0.6−0.4−19 = 210.2
The expected number of starting points for a fixed Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35): 257+10.2−4 = 263.2
5.2.4 Experiments
To make the above theoretical analysis more convincing, we carried out the following
experiments. For the t-step (t ≥ 37) differential characteristic and its corresponding
solution for Xi (16 ≤ i ≤ 35), we exhaust all possible values for X36 to verify the
conditions on Xi (37 ≤ i ≤ t ≤ 39) and record how many valid m4 exists. Moreover, for a
fixed valid m4, we also randomly choose 232 valid values for (X14, X15) and compute X13.
Then, we count the success times when the conditions on X13 hold (we will also check the
conditions on X40 if analyzing 40 steps of RIPEMD-160). We list the experimental results
in Table 11. Obviously, our theoretical analysis is reasonable.
6 Conclusion
Relying on the specifics of RIPEMD-160’s message expansion, an SFS collision attack
framework for reduced RIPEMD-160 is developed. Compared with previous SFS collision
attack framework, this new framework allows us to attack as many steps of RIPEMD-160
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Table 11: Experimental results
Steps The number of valid m4 Success times Success probability
37 0x36d40000 0x10001110 2−4
38 0xe0000 0xffff6f3 2−4
40 0x2d80 0xf1bd6ed 2−4
as possible. One more advantage of this new framework is negligible requirement of
memory. As a direct result, we present the first colliding message pairs for 36 and 37
steps of RIPEMD-160 with time complexity 241 and 249 repectively. Moreover, benefiting
from this framework, we can mount SFS collision attack on 38/40 steps of RIPEMD-160
with time complexity 252/274.6 respectively, thus extending the previously best known SFS
collision attack on RIPEMD-160 by four steps.
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A Differential Characteristics
The 36-step, 37-step, 38-step and 40-step differential characteristic are displayed in Table 12,
Table 13, Table 14 and Table 15 respectively.
Table 12: 36-step differential characteristic
∆m12 = 215
i X pi1(i) Y pi2(i)
1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5
2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14
3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2
7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11
8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4
9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13
10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8
13 - - - - - - - - - - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
14 - - nu - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - 10
15 - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - u - - - - - 14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 3
16 - 0 - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - u - - - - - 1 1 0n - - - - 15 - - - - - - - - - - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12
17n0 - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - 0 - - - - 1 - 1 1 0 - - - - 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6
18 0 - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 0 1 - - - - - 1 nu - 0 - - 0 - 4 - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11
19 - - - 0 1 1 0 1 1 - 0 1 1 1 1 1 u0 - - - - 0 n 0 0 1 - - 0 - 1 13 - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
20 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - 1 0 1n 1 - 0 0 - 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 u- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7
21nnnn1nn1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 0 1 1nu1 1 0 1 0 0u1 0 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
22 1 0 0 1 - 0 1n u1 - 0 1u 0n 1 - - 1 n 1nu ununnu1 - 6 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 13
23nn1 1 0u1 1 n1 0nu1 0 0 n0 0 1nnn1 0u1 1nnu1 15 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 5
24 1 1 0 1nu0 - 1 0uun0 1n u1n0 0 0 0n n1 1 0 1u1 0 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - un- - - - - - - - - 10
25 - 1 uu1nn1 - n 0 1 1 0 0 1 n0u0 1uuu 1n1 0 1uuu 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14
26 1 1 0 1 0 1 1u 1un0u1 0 - u 0 1uuuuu u0 0 1 - 0 1 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -0 - 0 1 - - - - - - - - - 15
27 0u1 1u0 0 1 0 0 1 1n1 - 1 uuun0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1 - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - 8
28 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 n1 1nnn0n 1 1 1 0 0n - 1 0n0n0nn1 5 - - - - - - - - -n - un- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12
29 0 1n0 0nu0 0 0u0 1nnu - 0 1uuu - u nunun1 1n 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4
30n 1u0 1n1 0 u0 1 0 0 1 1n 0 0 0 1 1 0 - 0 0 0 0 0un1u 14 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9
31 - 1 n 1 0 0 - n nn0 1 - 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 - 1 1 - nnn0 - 1 0u 11 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1
32 1 0n0 1 0 - 0 0 0 - - 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 - 1 0 0 - - 1 0u 8 - -u - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n 2
33 - - n - - - - - - - - - - - 0 0 1 - - - - 0 - - 1 - - - - - - u 3 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 15
34 - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - 1 10 - - - - - - 0 - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5
35 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14 - - - - - -u - -n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
36 - - - - - - n - - u - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - n - - u - - - - - - - 3
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Table 13: 37-step differential characteristic
∆m12 = 215
i X pi1(i) Y pi2(i)
1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5
2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14
3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2
7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11
8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4
9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13
10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8
13 - - - - 0 - - - - - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
14 - - - u 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - 13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - 10
15 - u - - - - - - - - 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - n - - - - - 14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 3
16 1 0 - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - n - - - - - - 1 uu - - - - 15 - - - - - - - - - - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12
17u1 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 1 0 0 - - - - 0 - 1 0 0 - - - - 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6
18 0 - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - 1 u 0 - - - - 0 - u 1 - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11
19n1 - - - - - - 1 0 0 - - - - - 0 1 - - - - 1 u - 0 - - 0 0 - - 13 - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
20 0 0 1 0n1 0 0 n0 1 1 0 - 1 1 u1uu1 - 0 0 1 0 - - 0 - - - 1 u - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7
21 0 0 1 1 1 0u0 0 - 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 - u 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
22 1 1 0 - 1 0 0u 1 0u - - 0 un 0 1 0 - 0 0 1u uuuu - 0 0 - 6 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 13
23 1un1 1nuu 1 - 1 0 0u0u 1 1u1uuun 1 0 0 1 0 1 0u 15 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 5
24 1 1 0n1 1nn 1 0 0 1uu1 1 0u0n1 0u1 u0nu0 0 1u 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - un- - - - - - - - - 10
25 0 0n0 0 1 0n 0nn0un0 0 0 0nnn0 1u 1 1u1 0 1 - 0 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14
26 0nnnnn - 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 - 1 0nnnnnn 0 1 1u0u1 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -0 - 0 1 - - - - - - - - - 15
27 0 1 0 - 0 0 1 1 nn0 1 1 0u1 1 0 0n0 1uu 0 0n1 0 1u1 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1 - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - 8
28 1nu1 1 1 1 1 uu1un0u0 1n0n1nnn n1 1 0 0n0 0 5 - - - - - - - - -n - un- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12
29u0 0 - uuuu 0 0u0 1 0 1u n0 - 0 0 1 1u 0 0 0 1n0uu 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4
30 1 1 1 - - 0 0 1 - 1 1 1 0u1 0 u - - 0 uuu0 0 - - uuu - - 14 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9
31 1 - - 1 - 1 1 - - - 0 1 - 1 nn n0 1 1 - nnn - - 1 - - - 1 1 11 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1
32 - - 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 - u 0 1 n - 0 1 - 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 8 - -u - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n 2
33 - - - - 0 1 1 - - - - 0 - 1 - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 15
34 - - - - - - 0 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10 - - 1 - - - 0 - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 5
35 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 0 14 - - - - - -u - -n - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - 1
36 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - n - - u 4 - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - n - - u - - - - - - - 3
37 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - u - - n - - - - - - - 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7
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Table 14: 38-step differential characteristic
∆m12 = 215
i X pi1(i) Y pi2(i)
1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5
2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14
3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2
7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11
8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4
9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13
10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8
13 - - - - - - - - - - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
14 - - - u 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - 10
15 - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - n - - - - - 14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 3
16 - 0 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - u - - - - - - 1 uu - - - - 15 - - - - - - - - - - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12
17u - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 0 - - - - 1 - 0 0 0 - - - - 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6
18 0 - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 0 1 1 1 - - - - - - u - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11
19 0 1 - 1 0 1 1 0 0 - - 0 - - - n u - - - - - - n - 0 1 - - - 1 0 13 - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
20 - - - - - - 0 1 u 1 - - - - 0 1 uu1 - - 1 0 0 1 1 - - - - - - 1 u - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7
21 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 - - - - u - 0 0 - - 1 0 0 0 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
22 1 - 0 0n - un u - - un - nn 0 - unnnnn nnnnnn1 - 6 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 13
23n0uuu - 1 0 0 - 1 0nuuu 0uuuu1nu n1 0 1nu11 15 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 5
24 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1un0 1u1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 - 1 0 0 0 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - un- - - - - - - - - 10
25uu1 1 1 0n0 0 1 0 - 0 1 0 0 0 - 0 nuu0 1 u1 1 1 0 1n0 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14
26 - 1 nu1 0 1u - - u 0 - 0 1 - - 0 0u 0 0 - - 1 1u - 0 1 1 - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -0 - 0 1 - - - - - - - - - 15
27 - 1 0 0 0uu0 - 1 0u 1n0 - - 0 nnn1 1 0 - - n - 1 - - 1 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1 - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - 8
28 0u1 0u0 0 - - 1 0 0 - 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 1 - - 5 - - - - - - - - -n - un- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12
29 1 - - 0 1 - - 0 1 1 1n - 0 1 - 0 0 - - - n 0n - - 0 1n - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4
30n - - 0 - - 0 u - 1 1 0 1 1 - - u - - - - 0 0 1 - - n 1 0 - - - 14 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9
31 0 0uuuuuu - - 1 0nu - - 1 - 0 0 - 1 0 - - - 1 1 1 1 - - 11 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1
32u - 1 1 1 1n1 - - - 1 0 1 - - n - - u - - 0 - nuu1 - 0 - - 8 - -u - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n 2
33 0 - 0 1 - - 1 - - 1 - un - - - 0 - - 0 - - 1 - 0 0 0 0 1 - - - 3 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 15
34u1 1n - - 0 - - 0 - 1 1 - - - 1 - - 1 - - 0 - - - - - 0 - - - 10 - - 1 - - - 0 - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 5
35 1 0 0 1 - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - 14 - - - - - -u - -n - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - 1
36 - - - - - - n - - u - 0 - - 0 - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 4 - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - n - - u - - - - - - - 3
37 - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - u - - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - 7
38 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - n - - u - - - - - - 14
192 New Semi-Free-Start Collision Attack Framework for Reduced RIPEMD-160
Table 15: 40-step differential characteristic
∆m12 = 215
i X pi1(i) Y pi2(i)
1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5
2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14
3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2
7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11
8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4
9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13
10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8
13 - - - - - - - - - - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
14 - - - u - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - 10
15 - u - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 u - - - - - 14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 3
16 - 0 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - u - - - - - - n 0u - - - - 15 - - - - - - - - - - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12
17u1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 0 - - - - 1 - 0 1 0 - - - - 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6
18 0 - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 0 1 1 - - - - 0 - u - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11
19 1 - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - u - - - - - 1 u - 0 - - - - - - 13 - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
20 - - - - - - - - u - - - - - - n - u - - - - 0 0 - 1 - - - - - - 1 u - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7
21 - - - - - - 1 - 0 - - - - 1 - 0 - 0 - - - - u - - - - - - - - - 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
22 - 0 - - 0 1 - 1 0 - - - - - - u - 1 0 0 0 - 0 - - - - - - - 1 - 6 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 13
23 1 0 0 0 1 0u0 - - - - 1 u - 0 - - - - 1 0 - 0 0 1 - - - 1 - - 15 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 5
24 - - - 1 - n 0u 0 - - 1 - 0 1 1 1 1 0unnnn - - 0 1un - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - un- - - - - - - - - 10
25 - 1 - 1 0 0 0 1 0n0u0nnn 0 1 0 0 1 1un 1 0 0 1 - 1 0 - 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14
26unu0 0 1uu 0 0 1u0 1 0 0 1u1 0 - - 0 1 1 1 1u1 1u1 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -0 - 0 1 - - - - - - - - - 15
27 0 1 1un0 1 1 nnuuuuuu uu1 0 0 0 0u 0 0u1 0 0u0 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1 - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - 8
28 0 0 1 1 1nun 0 1 1 1u1nn 0nnnnnn1 0n0 0nnn1 5 - - - - - - - - - n - un- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12
29nn1 1 1 0 1 0 n0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 - - 0 u 1 un1 0 1 0 1n 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4
30 0 1 1 - u 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0n - 1 1 0 1 1 0 0uu u1 1 1 0 1u0 14 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9
31n 0 0 1u1 1 - n - 0 u 1 1 1 0 nn - - u 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0n 11 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1
32 1 0 0 0uun0 1 - n 1n0 1 1 u0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 - n 0nu0 1 8 - -u - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n 2
33 0u1 1 1 0 1 0 1 - 0 0u 0 1u 1 - 1 1n 0 - u - - 0 1 1 1n0 3 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - 1 15
34 - 1 1n - 1 n 0 0 - 0 u 1 - n - - - 0 0 0 0 0 1 - - 0 0 1 0 1 - 10 - - 1 - - - 0 - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 0 - - - - - - 1 5
35 0u0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 1 - - 1 - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 - 0 0 0 - n - 14 - - - - - - n - - u - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - 1
36 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 0 - - - - - 1 - 4 - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - n - - u - - - - - - 1 3
37 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 u - 1 n - - - - - - - 9 - - - 1 - - - - - 1 - - - - -0 - - - - - 1 0 - 1 0 - - - - - 0 7
38 - - - - - - - - - - - 1 0 - 1 0 - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - 15 - - - - - 0 - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - u - - u - - 0 - - 1 14
39 - - - - - - - - - - - 0 n - 0 n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8 - - - - -u - - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 0 - -n - -u 6
40 - - - - - n - - u - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - u - - n 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9
